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The Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), enacted by Congress in
1938, established standards for
wages and hours of work. The
statute requires, among other
things, that employers compensate
employees for the time the employ-
er requires them to work. Soon after
the passage of the FLSA, the
Supreme Court decided several cas-
es that defined the concept of com-
pensable work. In these cases, the
Court concluded that time spent by
employees traveling and walking in
work settings constituted compens-
able work.
For example, in a case involving an
iron-ore mine, the Court held that
the miners must be compensated
for the time spent traveling down
the mine shafts to the working faces
of the mine. Tennessee Coal, Iron &
R.R. v. Mluscoda Local No. 123, 321
U.S. 5()() (1944). In a second case,
the Court held that a pottery plant
was required to pay its employees
for the time spent walking from the
time clocks at the plant entrance to
their work stations. Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680(
(1946).
In response to these Court rulings,
Congress passed the Portal-to-Portal
Act in 1947, amending the FLSA to
clarify that employers are not
required to pay employees for time
spent -walking, riding or traveling to
and from the actual place of perfor-
mance of the principal activity or
activities which such employees are
employed to perform" or for "activi-
ties which are preliminary or
postliminary to such activity or
activities," when such walking or
activity occurs before the employee
commences, or after the employee
ceases, the principal activity or
activities.
Subsequently, in Steiner v. Mitchell,
350 U.S. 247 (1956), the Court,
interpreting the Portal-to Portal Act,
held that activities performed before
the regular shift, which are an inte-
gral and indispensable part of the
principal activities, must be com-
pensated. In Steiner, batter, plant
employees who worked with danger-
ous toxic materials were required by
their employer to change into pro-
tective clothing before beginning
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work and to shower and change
clothes after ceasing work. The
Court found that donning and doff-
ing the required safety clothing was
an indispensable part of the princi-
pal activity of making batteries and
therefore was considered compens-
able work.
ISSUES
Does the Portal-to-Portal Act
exclude from compensation the
time employees spend walking to
and from required health and safety
equipment distribution stations?
Does the Act exclude from compen-
sation the time employees spend
waiting to receive their health and
safety equipment at required health
and safety equipment distribution
stations?
FACTS
The Supreme Court consolidated for
argument and decision two separate
cases involving the same legal issue.
The first case involves slaughter-
and-processing employees at IBP's
meat processing plant in Pasco,
Washington. The employees filed a
class-action lawsuit in federal dis-
trict court under the FLSA seeking
compensation for the time spent
donning and doffing required safety
equipment before and after their
work shifts, as well as for the atten-
dant time they spent walking and
waiting.
Both federal regulations and IBP poli-
cy require these employees to wear
certain safety clothing and sanitary
equipment. IBP requires employees
to store certain clothing and tools in
company lockers. Before beginning
work, the employees in the IBP case
went to the locker room, donned the
required clothing, proceeded to dis-
tribution points at other locations to
retrieve additional tools or equip-
ment, and then proceeded to their
work stations. At the end of their
shift, employees left their work sta-
tions, cleaned and returned equip-
ment at required locations, and then
proceeded to the locker room to
remove and store the remaining safe-
ty clothing and tools. The time spent
in the actual process of donning and
doffing the required clothing ranged
from three to 10 minutes per day
depending on the type of job the
worker performed; the time spent
walking from the locker room to the
distribution points, waiting in line,
and then walking to the work station
ranged from two to four minutes per
day. The employees were not com-
pensated for any of this time.
The district court concluded that,
under the FLSA, the employer was
required to pay for the donning,
doffing, and cleaning of required
protective gear and equipment
because such work was an integral
and indispensable part of the
employees' "principal activities"
under the Steiner rule.
Furthermore, the court also held
that the walking and waiting time
that occurred after the employees'
first compensable work activity
(donning equipment in the locker
room) and before the last compens-
able work activity (doffing such
equipment at that end of their shift)
also constituted compensable work
time.
IBP appealed the district court's
finding to the federal court of
appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The
court upheld the district court's
conclusions. It agreed that the pro-
tective gear was required by law and
the employer's rules, and that it was
therefore necessary to the principal
work performed and thus compens-
able under Steiner. Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit found, the district
court had properly reasoned that
the workday began with the perfor-
mance of the activity (donning of
equipment) that was integral and
indispensable to the work per-
formed and therefore that any sub-
sequent activity (such as walking
and waiting) was in the course of
employment and also compensable.
Similarly, the doffing of gear marked
the end of the workday and any pre-
vious activity was in the course of
employment. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc.,
339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003). IBP
filed a petition for writ of certiorari,
which the Supreme Court granted
on the question of the compensabil-
ity of the walking and waiting time.
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 125 S.Ct. 1291
(2005).
The second case concerns Barber
Foods, a secondary processor of
poultry-based products that has a
plant in Portland, Maine. Its
employees process boneless chicken
breasts into finished products such
as chicken fingers and chicken
nuggets. The employees are paid
from the time they punch in at time
clocks located at the entrance to the
production floor until they punch
out when they leave the production
floor.
Employees are required by the
employer and government regula-
tions to wear certain safety clothing
and sanitary garments. This clothing
must be on before the employees
can punch in and cannot be
removed until they punch out. The
employees filed a class action law-
suit in federal district court under
the FLSA seeking compensation for
the time spent donning and doffing
required clothing. The district court
held as a matter of law that the time
actually spent changing clothes was
an integral part of the employees'
work under the Steiner case, but
that any walking or waiting time in
connection with changing clothes
was excluded from compensation by
the Portal-to-Portal Act. The case
proceeded to trial, and the jury was
presented with the question
whether the employer was required
(Continued on Page 20)
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to compensate its employees for
time spent donning and doffing. The
jury found that since the amount of
time spent donning and doffing was
"de minimis." it was not compens-
able (under the legal principle that
the law does not recognize trifles).
The employees appealed the district
court's finding that the walking and
waiting time attendant to changing
clothes, was not compensable. They
argued that if that time were added
to the actual time spent changing
clothes it would no longer be de
minimis and the employees would
be entitled to compensation. On
review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit upheld the decision
of the district court. It found that
the Portal-to-Portal Act generally
exempts walking time from compen-
sation when it is preliminary or
"postliminary" activity. While
Steiner intended to compensate
employees for activity so integral to
a principal activity that it cannot be
separated, walking is neither inte-
gral to nor inseparable from the
principal activity. As such it is pre-
liminary and postliminary to the
principal activity and not compens-
able. Tum v. Barber Foods, Inc.,
360 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2004). The
employees filed a petition for writ of
certiorari, which the Supreme Court
granted, on the question of the com-
pensability of the walking and wait-
ing time. Turn v. Barber Foods, Inc.,
125 S.Ct. 1295 (2005).
CASE ANALYSIS
In these cases, the parties' argu-
ments are focused on the meaning
of the exemption language con-
tained in the Portal-to-Portal Act.
Specifically, the Act contains two
exemptions. It excludes from com-
pensation time spent (1) walking to
and from the place where the
employees perform their principal
activity or activities, and (2) on any
activity that is preliminary or
postliminary to the principal activi-
ty or activities, when such walking
or other activity occurs before the
employee commences or after the
employees ceases the principal
activity or activities.
The employers argue that the plain
language of the Act excludes the
walking and waiting time in these
cases. The employees' principal
activity is processing meat and poul-
try, not changing clothes. The actual
place of performance of that activity
is on the plant floors, not in the
locker rooms. Thus, the walking and
waiting occurs before the employees
begin work and after the employees
cease work and therefore, by the
express language of the Act, this
time is not compensable.
The decision in the Steiner case
does not require a different conclu-
sion. The Court in Steiner did not
address the issue of when the prin-
cipal activity commences or ceases
for purposes of defining the com-
pensable workday. Rather, the Court
held only that preliminary activities
that are integral and indispensable
to the principal activity are them-
selves compensable.
According to the employers, the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
Steiner is too expansive. It equated
integral activities with principal
activities and thus held that the
employees' performance of integral
activities begins the workday and
that any subsequent walking is
therefore outside the Portal-to-
Portal Act's exemption. However,
the Steiner case involved the second
exemption concerning the exclusion
of preliminary activity and did not
affect the scope of the first exemp-
tion. The Court specifically held
that preliminary work is compens-
able only if it is integral and indis-
pensable to the principal activity
and not specifically excluded by the
first exemption. Thus the Court rec-
ognized that pre-shift and post-shift
walking is still exempt even when it
occurs between other activities that
are compensable.
The history behind the passage of
the Act makes clear that Congress
intended travel time before work to
be outside the scope of mandatory
compensation under the FLSA.
Congress chose the language for
defining the beginning of the work-
day as occurring at the "actual place
of performance of the principal
activity" to ensure that time spent
getting to the actual place of perfor-
mance would not be considered
compensable. The legislative history
reveals the congressional intent to
exclude from compensation all time
spent walking to and from the actu-
al place where the employees per-
form their principal activity.
Moreover, the interpretive guidance
issued by the Department of Labor
(DOL), the federal agency charged
with enforcement of the FLSA, indi-
cates that walking time is excluded
from compensation. Specifically, the
DOL noted that even if changing
clothes is compensable as integral
to the principal activity, "this does
not necessarily mean ... that travel
between the ... clothes-changing
place and the actual place of perfor-
mance ... would be excluded from
the type of travel to which the first
exemption refers."
The employers also say that the
Ninth Circuit's contrary interpreta-
tion-that activity that is integral to
the principal activity starts the
workday-would lead to absurd
results. Compensation for walking
would depend on the fortuity of
where the compensable gear is
located. It could even depend on the
order in which employees retrieve
their gear. An employee who first
dons compensable gear and then
I retrieves and dons noncompensable
gear (that is, gear that the employee
wears for his or her own conve-
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nience but is not required by the
employer) would be paid for walking
and waiting whereas an employee
who does the reverse would not.
The Ninth Circuit's finding that the
workday commences with the first
compensable activity is not com-
pelled by either Steiner or the
Portal-to-Portal Act. As noted by the
First Circuit, the workday begins at
the actual place of performance of
the principal activity, not with the
performance of activity integral to
the principal activity. A more
expansive definition of the workday
would undermine the purpose
behind the Act of excluding from
compensation travel time to the
place of work.
Finally, the employers contend, the
walking and waiting is not itself
integral and indispensable to the
employees' principal activities and
thus does not fit within the Steiner
Court's definition of compensable
activity.
The employees' arguments also rely
on the clear language of the Portal-
to-Portal Act, the Steiner case, DOL
regulations, and legislative history.
The employees argue that the Act
only exempts walking and activities
that occur before the employees
begin theirfirst principal activity of
the day and after they perform their
last principal activity. The DOL
shares this interpretation in its
guidelines, which note that activi-
ties engaged in by an employee
"after" the employee commences
the first principal activity are not
within the Act's exemptions. The
guidelines state that the compens-
able workday is the period between
the commencement and completion
of the employee's principal activity.
The Act does not interrupt the com-
pensability of the continuous work-
day. The employees say the First
Circuit therefore erred in Barber
Foods when it created a discontinu-
ous workday. Having found that the
donning and doffing was compens-
able, that court subsequently held
that compensation ceases during
intervening periods of walking and
waiting, only to resume when the
employees arrive at the production
floor. The First Circuit failed to rec-
ognize that the Act's exemption for
walking is not absolute but only
applies when the walking occurs pri-
or to the commencement of the
employees' principal activity or
activities.
Moreover, the Act repeatedly refers
to "principal activity or activities,"
clearly indicating that Congress
contemplated that there may be
more than one principal activity.
The Steiner case adopted this view.
The Court held that the term "prin-
cipal activity or activities" includes
all activities that are an integral
part of the principal activity, and
thus clothes changing was a princi-
pal activity. There is no distinction
between "principal activities" and
an activity that is integral and indis-
pensable to the principal activities.
Thus, once the courts of appeals
found that the donning and doffing
at IBP and Barber Foods were inte-
gral and indispensable to the work-
ers' duties (which findings were
unchallenged), those activities were
necessarily also found to be princi-
pal activities. To be excluded from
compensation under the Act, the
walking must take place before or
after the principal activities, where-
as in these cases the walking
occurred after the principal activity
of donning the safety gear and is
therefore compensable.
The DOL guidelines specifically
indicate that the exemption does
not include "travel from the place of
performance of one principal activi-
ty to the place of performance of
another." The section of the guide-
lines relied on by the employers is
found in a footnote and merely rec-
ognizes the possibility that some
travel incidental to clothes changing
may be exempt but does not state
that such travel is always exempt.
The Secretary of Labor, in regula-
tions issued pursuant to the FLSA,
has defined hours of work, noting
that "[w]here an employee is
required to report to a meeting
place to receive instructions or to
perform work there, or to pick up
and to carry tools, the travel from
the designated place to the work-
place is part of the day's work...."
The legislative history of the Portal-
to-Portal Act indicates that the
exemptions contained in the statute
related only to activities that take
place prior to or subsequent to the
employees' principal activity or
activities. However, the employees
say, activities that occur during the
workday were not to be affected by
the Act's exemptions. Thus, the
touchstone for the compensability
or noncompensability of walking or
waiting is whether these activities
precede the first principal activity
or follow the last principal activity.
The employees at Barber Foods also
argue that, under Steiner, any activ-
ity that is integral and indispensable
to the principal activity is compens-
able regardless of whether it occurs
outside the workday. They say that
the walking and waiting activities in
these cases are integral and indis-
pensable to the employees' principal
activities and therefore are com-
pensable. Because federal regula-
tions require that employees wear
safety and sanitary equipment
whenever they are on the produc-
tion floor, these regulations require
that the gear be donned and doffed
away from the production floor,
thus necessitating the walk from the
place of donning and doffing to the
production floor. The method cho-
sen by the employer to arrange for
the distribution of the gear also
(Continued on Page 22)
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necessitates walking and waiting in
line. Thus the walking and waiting
time are closely related to other
duties performed by the employees
and are therefore compensable.
Lastly, the absurd results decried by
the employers can easily be avoided
by the employers themselves. They
can regulate the means and manner
in which employees don and doff
the required gear to prevent the
predicted incongruities.
SIGNIFICANCE
Although these cases specifically
deal with food processing employ-
ees, the Court's decision will affect
types of work in other industries. In
many other types of industries,
employees are required to don pro-
tective clothing prior to beginning
their productive work, including
high tech industries in which equip-
ment must be manufactured in so-
called "clean rooms" and jobs that
involve employees working with
dangerous solvents, chemicals, or
sprays. In other types of work,
employers may need to provide
information or distribute materials
that are integral to the principal
activity prior to the beginning of
productive work. Should the Court
determine that the walking and
waiting time at issue is compens-
able, employers in these other types
of industries will have to pay their
employees for any walking and wait-
ing that occurs after the integral
activity begins. This may lead
employers to reconfigure work
schedules or production activity to
minimize the "downtime" between
integral and principal activity.
If, however, the Court determines
that such time is not compensable,
then the "cost" of waiting will be
shifted to employees and there will
be no incentive for employers to
minimize such lost time or to be
more efficient with employee down-
time. If time is money, then the way
in which the Court answers the
question presented in these cases
will determine from whose pocket
the money will come.
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